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A critical review of the literature relating to government
policy and behavioural aspects relevant to the uptake and
application of microgeneration in the UK is presented.
Given the current policy context aspiring to zero-carbon
new homes by 2016 and a variety of minimum standards
and ﬁnancial policy instruments supporting
microgeneration in existing dwellings, it appears that this
class of technologies could make a signiﬁcant contribution
to UK energy supply and low-carbon buildings in the
future. Indeed, achievement of a reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions by 80% (the UK government’s 2050 target)
for the residential sector may entail substantial
deployment of microgeneration. Realisation of the large
potential market for microgeneration relies on a variety
of interrelated factors such as microeconomics,
behavioural aspects, the structure of supporting policy
instruments and well-informed technology development.
This paper explores these issues in terms of current and
proposed policy instruments in the UK. Behavioural
aspects associated with both initial uptake of the
technology and after purchase are also considered.
1. INTRODUCTION
Energy supply and demand is high on the international agenda,
with issues such as climate change and energy security potentially
having profound societal, environmental and economic
consequences. International policy intended to tackle climate
change (e.g. the Kyoto protocol) places a requirement on
governments to decarbonise the energy supply chain. The 4th
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment
report identiﬁed the built environment as having the largest
economic potential for mitigation of carbon dioxide emissions.1
The residential sector accounts for around a quarter of UK
carbon dioxide emissions and low-carbon energy technologies
that can be applied in this sector are therefore of particular
interest.
Microgeneration is the generation of zero- or low-carbon heat
and/or power by individuals, small businesses and communities to
meet their own needs. In many situations, local generation has the
potential to achieve much higher efﬁciency, and consequential
carbon dioxide and cost savings, by avoiding the losses associated
with delivering electrical power via the grid over long distances
and/or through the use of both heat and power at the point of use.
Microgeneration also has the potential to help combat fuel
poverty, add to the diversity of energy supply, offset some of
the looming shortfall in centralised generating capacity and avoid
the need to replace or extend electricity transmission
infrastructure.
A range of microgeneration technologies exist that either harness
energy from the environment (small-scale wind turbines, water
turbines, heat pumps, solar thermal collectors, solar photovoltaics
(PV), etc.) or generate heat and power from a fuel (e.g. internal
combustion engines, Stirling engines and fuel cells). There are
currently 100 000 microgeneration installations in the UK.
However, with a potential for tens of millions of installations, the
uptake of microgeneration needs to be accelerated in order to
realise its potential.
This paper is a result of activities within the United Kingdom
Energy Research Centre (UKERC) cross-theme research project on
microgeneration.2 It is the ﬁrst in a series of ‘position papers’
dealing with the issues relating to microgeneration, with a
particular focus on residential-scale generation in the UK. The
issues considered include policy, behavioural aspects of uptake
and use, microgeneration technologies, system modelling,
techno-economics, integration with the electricity grid, life-cycle
analysis, and so on. This paper reviews current and proposed UK
policy on microgeneration and the factors inﬂuencing human
behaviour in its uptake and use.
The interconnection between policy instruments and behavioural
aspects is an important research area that has not beneﬁted from
detailed attention. Policy is generally focused on uptake;
behaviour and usage patterns after uptake are not usually
addressed. However, for residential-scale microgeneration,
behavioural aspects are key and policy should be formulated with
them in mind.
2. MICROGENERATION POLICY IN THE UK
2.1. The general policy environment
Spurred by international concern regarding climate change, the
UK government indicated an aspiration to achieve a 60%
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reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 in the 2003 Energy
White Paper.3 This aspiration has become a requirement in law via
the government’s recent Climate Change Act.4 This act increased
the target to 80%, which is more appropriate to prevent
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration levels exceeding those
required for climate stabilisation. Approximately 25% of current
UK greenhouse gas emissions are a result of heat and electricity
use in the residential sector.5 As such, it has become a focus of
policy and regulation. Among a variety of measures that could
make an impact, microgeneration is considered to be one area that
could aid meeting the ambitious emissions reduction targets for
the sector in a cost-effective manner, while also providing a
measure of energy security through diversity and geographical
distribution.
The past decade has seen substantial developments in both broad
UK energy policy and speciﬁc policy and regulation relating to
microgeneration, complemented by signiﬁcant technological
advances in microgeneration systems. This section presents a
critical review of current and proposed policy and regulation
relating to microgeneration in the UK. A wide range of measures
exists, some with obtuse relationship to the beneﬁt or detriment of
commercialisation prospects for microgeneration. Only those
measures perceived to have a direct bearing on commercial uptake
and application patterns of microgeneration by owner-operators
are presented. For example, support measures such as academic
and commercial research and development funding are not
presented here.
2.2. Policy instruments for microgeneration
2.2.1. Broad policy instruments and related activity. The Climate
Change and Sustainable Energy Act 2006 included a number of
broad measures relevant to microgeneration.6 Key among these is
a provision to allow the secretary of state to set targets for
national uptake of microgeneration, and to require electricity
suppliers to offer terms for buyback of electricity. These measures
are positive general steps to encourage industry investment and
improve the economic case for microgeneration. They are related
to a number of other activities under way in government and
government agencies, and it remains to be seen what action will
transpire. It is likely that the setting of targets will only come
about if an economic case can be made for microgeneration and,
for many technologies, that may in turn depend upon the
provision of payback for exported electricity or generated
electricity by suppliers.
Among activities related to the broad microgeneration policy,
probably the most challenging are those related to connection,
metering, balancing and settlement. Recent actions related to this
issue are that
(a) connection rules have been streamlined7
(b) regulations governing safety have been established8
(c) the requirement for half-hourly metering has been removed
for small systems.9
A number of issues still remain, many of which are related to the
simplicity and logistics of microgenerator installation and
operation. Many of these issues relate to data ﬂows within the
balancing and settlement code (BSC), in order to allow
microgeneration export to participate in system balancing
effectively and to be fairly settled. Data ﬂow issues should be
resolvable, albeit at some expense. Arguably, metering costs, etc.
will cost more than the value of export for some microgenerators,
although metering issues are an important behavioural concern,
as discussed in Section 3.6.
Perhaps the most challenging issue regarding balancing and
settlement is that of creating standardised proﬁle classes for
dwellings with microgenerators (and for microgeneration export).
Standard proﬁle classes are a tool used in balancing and
settlement where half-hourly metered data are not available. They
are expensive to create and, for microgeneration, may be
inaccurate as generation proﬁles may vary signiﬁcantly even
between technologies of the same type. This not only creates
difﬁculty regarding fair settlement for each generator but also has
implications regarding effective low-cost balancing of the system
in real time. In the future, these standard proﬁle classes may be
replaced by a smart metering and information technology
solution.
As the amount of microgeneration increases and the amount of
large, central generating capacity deceases, it will become
necessary for microgeneration to be controllable in order to
maintain a stable electricity system. The roles of system balancing,
local voltage control and phase balancing are particularly
important. For these reasons, smart metering and two-way
communication with the supplier will become necessary to enable
microgeneration to meet the needs of the grid, and for
householders to be ﬁnancially rewarded for controlling
microgeneration in this way.
2.2.2. Speciﬁc ﬁnancial policy instruments. The most targeted
existing policy to support the uptake of microgeneration is the
microgeneration strategy.10 The primary policy instrument of
this strategy is the low-carbon buildings programme (LCBP),
which provided £86 million of treasury funding to be applied in
grant support for new microgeneration installations. £18 million
of this was available for the ‘households’ stream of the LCBP,
beginning in March 2006, and continuing for three years or until
funding runs out. At the time of writing, approximately £7
million has been committed to support over 7000 new
microgeneration installations. Technologies supported in the
households stream are micro-wind, micro-hydro, solar PV, solar
hot water, heat pumps, biomass room heaters and biomass
boilers. Micro combined heat and power (micro-CHP) was not
supported at the time of writing but was listed as a technology
that will be supported.11
There are two further policy instruments that aid in providing
capital cost reductions to potential owner-operators: the carbon
emissions reduction target (CERT) for energy suppliers and value-
added tax (VAT) relief for the purchase of energy-saving items.
Both these instruments are directed at carbon dioxide saving
actions in general. Microgeneration has been included in the list of
items supported in the predecessor to CERT, the 2005–2008 energy
efﬁciency commitment.12 It is also included in CERT13 as a market
transformation action ‘where the authority approves the
promotion of microgeneration’. If this requirement is met,
microgeneration can provide up to 12% of a supplier’s CERT (after
uplift of 50% carbon dioxide reduction for market transformation
actions is applied). Some microgeneration measures have been
supported through VAT relief since 200114 and others have also
qualiﬁed for this support via various statutory instruments since
2004.15–17
24 Energy 162 Issue EN1 UK microgeneration. Part I: policy and behavioural aspects Bergman et al.
The CERT is a regulatory measure directed at energy suppliers (i.e.
the retail element of the liberalised energy market), requiring them
to perform ‘qualifying actions’ that cumulatively provide carbon
dioxide emissions reduction from the residential sector over a
‘commitment period’ equal to (or greater than) their target, as set
by the gas and electricity market regulator, the Ofﬁce of Gas and
Electricity Markets (Ofgem). The CERT is a development from
previous energy-efﬁciency commitments (EECs), which had a very
similar structure, although each three-year commitment period
since 2002 has approximately doubled the required carbon
dioxide savings. Qualifying actions are typically energy-
efﬁciency measures such as loft and cavity wall insulation or
energy-efﬁcient lighting, each of which has a speciﬁc carbon
dioxide saving associated with it (set by Ofgem). This mechanism
essentially emulates a cap-and-trade system – that is, the carbon
dioxide emissions reduction target is established and suppliers are
then allowed to ﬁnd the cheapest way to achieve that target,
including encouraging uptake of qualifying actions, and trade of
actions and commitments among themselves. (While the system
emulates cap-and-trade, it is not identical. It does not genuinely
cap carbon dioxide emissions, but rather provides for a reduction
over a business-as-usual scenario. Therefore actual emissions
reduction achieved at the end of a period with respect to the
beginning of the period is difﬁcult to quantify, and the overall
outcome may indeed be an emissions increase.) Typically, a
supplier performs a qualifying action by subsidising the cost of
installation and then claiming the associated carbon dioxide
savings. According to the CERT consultation,18 some of the
cheapest measures are loft and cavity wall insulation, with
lifetime carbon dioxide savings and suppliers’ average
contribution to total cost of 13.46 tCO2/£261 and 4.39 tCO2/
£227, respectively. This equates to an implied cost of £20 and
£52 per tonne of carbon dioxide, respectively. As a number of
different qualifying actions will be used by suppliers to meet the
target, the average cost of these actions can be determined,
resulting in an implied cost per tonne of carbon dioxide
reduction. The remainder of this analysis assumes that the
implied cost of carbon dioxide is £20/t (i.e. near the carbon
saving cost of average loft insulation).
Following the reduction of VAT for residential fuel and electricity
consumption, VAT relief for ‘energy-saving items’ has been
provided in the UK since 1997 in order to align incentives to save
energy (and avoid climate change) with incentives to circumvent
fuel poverty. This incentive cuts the VAT rate on selected items
from the usual 17.5% to 5%. The initial list of items included
energy-efﬁciency measures such as insulation, and some
microgeneration measures were subsequently added (wind
turbines, solar PV and water turbines). Ground, air and water
source heat pumps, micro-CHP and biomass boilers have also been
added to the list of supported items.15–17 VAT relief provides
capital cost reduction to these measures, regardless of how/where/
when they are applied.
Three other speciﬁc ﬁnancial incentives exist for microgeneration
owner-operators
(a) income tax exemption for revenue from microgeneration
export
(b) renewable obligations certiﬁcate (ROC) generation19,20
(c) a time-limited stamp duty exemption applied to sale of zero-
carbon dwellings.21
However, none of these measures is likely to have a signiﬁcant
impact on the economic case for investment. Income tax
exemption is a useful simplifying measure, as it means that the
owner-operator may not be required to complete a taxation self-
assessment each year. While no detailed calculation is performed
here, the authors believe the net economic impact (on owner-
operator economics and on public revenue from taxation) would
be minimal as monies paid in tax on export revenues would be
somewhat balanced by monies received as tax refunds for
equipment depreciation and fuel costs. What portion of capital
investment could be depreciated is debatable, as the device’s
application is split between personal use (for heating and/or
electricity) and commercial purposes. Additionally, if a large
number of devices were in operation, the impact on public revenue
may become more signiﬁcant, and this measure may need
alteration. A method where taxation is collected at source (i.e. by
the supplier), similar to that applied for personal interest payments
in the UK banking system, may be more appropriate in that case.
Stamp duty exemption for the sale of ‘zero-carbon’ dwellings will
probably provide little incentive for microgeneration uptake,
because the cost of making a dwelling zero-carbon will usually
exceed the value of the incentive. Indeed, stamp duty exemption
appears to be a short-lived incentive, being time-limited to ﬁve
years (after which it will be reassessed).
Notwithstanding this issue, the use of microgeneration is currently
the only way to achieve truly ‘zero-carbon’ status as the dwelling
must usually export electricity to the grid and receive credit for
displaced carbon dioxide emissions to be truly zero-carbon. It
should be noted that ‘zero-carbon’ here refers to a dwelling
emissions rate (DER) less than or equal to zero, as calculated under
the standard assessment procedure (SAP) 2005 methodology (see
Section 2.2.3). This methodology only considers calculated carbon
dioxide emissions from energy use for heating, ventilation and
lighting. Electricity from other sources is not included, and as such
the dwelling need not be truly zero-carbon to achieve ‘zero-
carbon’ status.
2.2.3. Building regulations and the Merton rule. Probably the
most important policy instrument discussed here is building
regulations. This discussion covers only English and Welsh
building regulations, although issues are broadly reﬂected across
the UK and the SAP is applied universally. Over the past few
decades, the energy performance standard required in part L22,23
of the building regulations for new build and refurbishment of
existing stock has increased dramatically, although questions
have been raised regarding weak compliance with part L in
comparison with other regulations.24
The trend of tightening building regulations is set to continue,
with assessment of new buildings against an enhanced standard
set out in the code for sustainable homes25 to become mandatory.
The code for sustainable homes sets out a points-based system for
evaluating a dwelling, with points allocated for various aspects of
sustainability, along with certain minimum standards in speciﬁc
areas (such as energy performance). The code incorporates six
levels of sustainability, ranging from a ‘one star’ rating
corresponding to slightly better than current building regulations
to ‘six stars’ corresponding to the highest level of sustainability.
The government has indicated that all new dwellings be built to a
‘truly zero-carbon’ standard from 2016. ‘Truly zero-carbon’
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means that zero net carbon dioxide emissions arise from energy
use/generation in the dwelling. This corresponds to ‘six star’ level
in the code. ‘Five star’ level corresponds to ‘zero carbon’ for the
SAP 2005 building regulations standard.
Microgeneration within the dwelling is currently the only method
by which code level 5 zero-carbon status can be achieved, and
microgenerators exporting electricity to the network would
normally be required to displace emissions related to on-site
energy consumption and thereby meet code level 6, truly zero-
carbon. It is important to note that several microgenerators will
generally be required in each dwelling to meet the level 5 and level
6 zero-carbon standards of the code for sustainable homes.
The energy performance aspects of the code would be
implemented through building regulations, and therefore would
be calculated using a new version of the SAP methodology. The
current SAP26 includes microgeneration as a measure that can be
used towards carbon dioxide savings where generated electricity
is assumed to displace grid emissions at a rate of 0.568 kg/kWh
(while electricity consumption is assumed to embody only
0.422 kg/kWh). The different emissions factors applied for
consumption versus on-site production of electricity are
contentious. The 0.422 ﬁgure is based on the government’s
long-term projections for the average mix of grid electricity from
2005 to 2010. The 0.568 ﬁgure is based on the 1998–1999
marginal mix of generating plant plus a factor to account for new
build from 2005 to 2010, assuming that it would be combined
cycle gas turbines. This methodology has been challenged and will
likely be revised.
The Merton rule has also proven to be an important aspect of
governance related to microgeneration. It is a planning policy
requirement imposed by local councils requiring a certain
percentage of renewable energy (or expected carbon dioxide
reduction) in any new development above a prescribed size. This
translates to a strengthening of the building regulations in
speciﬁc developments in that they must meet certain additional
criteria. The Merton rule, initially imposed by the London
Borough of Merton, requires 10% of energy in new
developments of ten or more units (or above 1000m2) to come
from renewable sources. Very similar approaches have since
been adopted by a signiﬁcant portion of local councils; central
government has encouraged its adoption, making renewable
energy (often delivered via microgeneration as opposed to
community or centralised schemes) a key aspect of many new
developments. The relative efﬁcacy of central government
versus local or regional approaches has since become an
interesting topic of debate, with early indications suggesting
that while centralised strategy is necessary, local approaches are
potentially much more effective in realising microgeneration
installations. The primary criticism of the Merton rule is that
some implementations can be technology-deterministic, and
may not be the cheapest way to deliver carbon dioxide
reductions. Furthermore, microgeneration capacity is determined
at the design stage; once the building is in use the 10% target
may not be met in practice due to the behaviour of its
occupants.
2.3. Critical analysis of policy instruments
Clearly, there are a wide variety of supporting mechanisms for
microgeneration, ranging from direct grant support, through to
broad aspirational support such as targets. The combination of
raising minimum standards through building regulations while
supporting commercial investment through actions to reduce
capital cost could probably be effective in terms of uptake, but
it may not lead to appropriate usage patterns for the devices
once they are installed. Additionally, policy mechanisms are
sometimes misdirected, and the wide range of actions can lead
to conﬂicts or overlaps that are confusing to residential owner-
operators who generally prefer simple one-stop-shop solutions.
Table 1 makes an estimate of the average level of ‘societal’ support
available for selected microgeneration technologies through the
three primary ﬁnancial policy instruments – the LCBP, the CERT
and VAT relief. Total installed cost ﬁgures are approximated from
a variety of sources, with variations according to LCBP data and
the authors’ experience. Importantly, microgeneration systems
that can be classiﬁed as home heating solutions – where they can
entirely replace the existing conventional alternative (usually a
gas-ﬁred condensing boiler at £2500 installed cost) – are
evaluated based on the difference in total installed cost between
the microgeneration system and the conventional alternative;
these technologies are indicated by italic typeface in Table 1.
Carbon dioxide savings for micro-CHP reported here are based on
authors’ estimates,27,28 generally supported by results of the
Carbon Trust’s micro-CHP ﬁeld trial.29 When interpreting Table 1
it is important to note that reported simple payback periods are
with respect to the capital cost after government support has been
taken into account. It is therefore an estimate of the payback seen
by the potential owner-operator, which is shorter than normal
payback periods. It should be noted that all data presented in Table
1 are subject to the speciﬁc stated assumptions, and wide
variations are apparent in terms of performance of technologies
and energy consumption in individual dwellings. The information
presented is indicative only.
Two clear conclusions may be drawn from Table 1. First, it is
obvious that the combination of policy instruments is supporting
a wide range of carbon prices. This range is due to the LCBP and
VAT relief. The LCBP is therefore not a measure speciﬁcally
directed at achieving carbon dioxide emissions reduction, but is
more a platform to raise the proﬁle of the technologies and kick-
start the market. Likewise, VAT relief is indiscriminate in terms of
support for carbon dioxide reduction, providing 12% capital cost
reduction regardless of performance. It could be argued that the
LCBP is more directed than VAT relief, as the LCBP process
represents a form of vetting of applications (external beneﬁts are
gained through LCBP in that in order to be eligible for support a
dwelling must be well insulated, install quality heating controls
and efﬁcient lighting). The second conclusion to be drawn from
Table 1 is that microgeneration systems that are home heating
solutions can beneﬁt greatly from support, with payback times to
the supported owner-operator of only a few years for near-to-
medium-term micro-CHP technology.
The CERT is a much more carbon dioxide savings oriented
mechanism, providing a ﬁxed reduction target and ﬂexibility on
how to meet it. In the sense that qualifying actions compete with
one another, the CERT should provide an economically efﬁcient
overall solution. Possibly the biggest deﬁciency in the CERT is that
carbon dioxide savings are measured with respect to a business-
as-usual scenario and therefore do not necessarily provide an
absolute carbon dioxide reduction. There is no simple solution to
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this problem and there is no simple way to measure absolute
reduction at the individual residential level. Most possibilities
involve metering dwellings beneﬁting from an action, and
adjusting readings for a variety of factors that are difﬁcult to
quantify (average temperature, seasonal, behavioural, etc.).
Nevertheless, the development of a cap-and-trade system similar
to CERT but which provides absolute emissions reduction is an
interesting possibility for future policy direction.
At the other end of the policy spectrum are minimum standards
regulations such as building regulations and local planning
policies. At country-level, the proposed direction for building
regulations (e.g. the code for sustainable homes) is a powerful tool
that could effectively mandate the introduction of substantial
microgeneration. The details of implementation of such policies
require careful consideration. For example, the current
assumption within the SAP is that microgeneration beneﬁts from
a higher displaced carbon dioxide rate than on-site consumption.
Indeed, the current distinction between a zero DER as calculated
by the SAP and ‘truly zero-carbon’ level 6 of the code for
sustainable homes requires attention.
The ﬁnal point regarding regulation relates to local versus
national approaches and the need to link them effectively.
Devolved approaches appear to be a powerful tool for realising
national direction, and clear distinction of the roles of local,
regional and national policy and regulation could aid certainty in
the microgeneration industry.
Perhaps the primary question regarding how these policy
instruments relate to microgeneration is ‘how predictable are the
carbon dioxide savings for each technology?’ Any carbon dioxide
saving item, including energy-efﬁciency measures, has some
uncertainty with respect to actual carbon dioxide savings. For
example, savings attributable to cavity wall insulation are roughly
dependent on the annual thermal demand of the dwelling, but are
also inﬂuenced by other factors such as the behaviour of the
owners. Likewise, as suggested by the interim results of the Carbon
Trust’s micro-CHP ﬁeld trial29 and a variety of published modelling
studies, carbon dioxide savings from micro-CHP technology are
correlated with annual thermal demand. In the past, EECs have
attributed average savings to each measure, relying on a large
number of installations to provide the correct aggregate savings.
This assumption could still function reasonably well when
microgeneration is added to the list of supported measures, but
nonetheless probably does not provide the optimum carbon dioxide
savings for the given public or private investment. Suppliers might
be better encouraged to incentivise effective investment if they
were required to estimate carbon dioxide savings and meet a certain
standard before providing support, although such an approach
could be overly onerous.
All of the issues discussed above serve to highlight that while
progress has been made regarding policy and regulation for
microgeneration (and related actions), there is great potential for
developing further understanding and approaches. Current
microgeneration policy is focused on uptake of systems and does
Technology Estimated
total
installed
cost,
including
VAT at
5%: £
Estimated
LCBP
grant
support: £
Estimated
CERT
support
assuming
£20/tCO2
value to
supplier: £
VAT
reduction
from 17.5
to 5%: £
Total
public
support: £
Estimated
lifetime
carbon
dioxide
emissions
reduction:
tCO2
Public cost
of carbon
dioxide
saved:
£/tCO2
Simple payback
period for
owner-
operator with
government
support: years
1 kWe solar PV 5500 2000 240 714 2914 9 329 58
1 kWe micro-wind† 1800 540 140 214 834 7 128 18
GSHP‡ 10 000 1200 720 1190 3110 36 86 56
Biomass boilerx 10 000 1500 1520 1190 4210 76 55 8–1{
Low-HPR micro-CHP 4000 500†† 200†† 476 1176 10†† 118 5
High-HPR micro-CHP 3500†† 500†† 100†† 417 1017 5†† 203 4
Solar hot water‡‡ 3200 400 160 381 941 8 118 53
 The solar PV unit is assumed to have a yield of 800 kWh/year,30 with 50% consumed on-site and 50% exported to the grid. It is assumed to have a 25-year
lifetime. Note that the capital/installation costs of PV are highly non-linear at the small scale
† The micro-wind turbine is assumed to produce 876 kWh/year (i.e. 10% load factor), with 50% consumed on-site and 50% exported to the grid. It is assumed
to have a 20-year lifetime. This represents a high-yield site, i.e. exposed, with low turbulence and average wind speed above 5m/s; it is arguably above the UK
average
‡ The GSHP (ground source heat pump) is assumed to meet space heating needs and 50% of domestic hot water needs, has a 30-year lifetime, a coefﬁcient of
performance of 4:1 and is run on grid electricity
xThe biomass boiler is a high-quality self-feeding system. It is assumed to have a 20-year lifetime. It consumes 4 t of fuel per year, at a cost up to £210/t
{An eight-year payback requires free wood as a fuel, otherwise the payback time is currently inﬁnite because woodchip fuel entails an annual cost greater
than that of gas under these pricing assumptions
 HPR is heat-to-power ratio, a key technical metric differentiating micro-CHP systems. All micro-CHP data presented are based on near- to medium-term
technology with ten-year lifetime
†† Authors’ estimate; no precedent exists for this technology
‡‡ The solar hot water system is assumed to meet 50% of hot water needs; 20-year lifetime
Table 1. Total societal cost of policy instruments for key microgeneration technologies. All economic estimates made using a current
residential energy tariff offered by a major supplier, for energy consumption corresponding to a UK median dwelling. Exported electricity is
assumed to attract 4p/kWh payment. All carbon calculations based on assumed embodied carbon dioxide of 0.43 kg/kWh for electricity
and 0.19 kg/kWh for gas. Payback is calculated assuming 0% cost of capital and zero operating expenses. It is recognised that all results are
estimates and substantial variation exists from installation to installation. Both CERT support and VAT reduction are notional amounts. The
level of CERT support provided by a supplier is dependent on a business offering and therefore challenging to quantify. VAT reduction is
not seen by the owner-operator; it is an avoided expense rather than cash support
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not pay sufﬁcient attention to how consumers behave after
installation. These behavioural aspects are discussed in more
detail in the next section, highlighting that the interconnection
between policy mechanisms and behaviour is key if policy goals
are to be met through microgeneration. This interconnect is not
well understood and would beneﬁt from further research
incorporating technical understanding, policy development and
behavioural sciences. A suite of policy instruments to deliver
reliable near-term carbon dioxide savings at low public and
private cost needs to be developed to speciﬁcally address the
unique aspects of the residential sector. Looking further into the
future, the potential to completely decarbonise residential heating
should be addressed, and should include the creation of an
understanding of path dependency (i.e. the possibility of sub-
optimal lock-in) and associated policy. This is particularly true of
standards and policy related to zero-carbon buildings and
implementation of the Merton rule.
3. BEHAVIOURAL ASPECTS
Maximising energy and emissions savings via microgeneration
requires both signiﬁcant uptake of the technology among
consumers and behavioural changes in domestic energy use. As
discussed earlier, much existing policy focuses on uptake only,
which may not encourage appropriate behavioural changes. This
section puts microgeneration in the context of energy-related
behaviour and the broader social and infrastructural measures
that could shift domestic energy use to more sustainable patterns.
Consideration of these issues in policy instrument formulation
could enable policy aims to be achieved.
3.1. Behaviour and behaviour change
Energy-related behaviour is often thought of simply as
‘consumption’. However, consumption is not just about satisfying
needs, but is connected to identity and meaning creation; material
goods play symbolic roles in our lives beyond their functional
uses. Speciﬁcally, environmentally signiﬁcant (consumer)
behaviour is culturally embedded and includes social, moral and
normative considerations.31
There is a distinction between routine behaviour, which is
repetitive and can become habitual and therefore reduces rational,
conscious deliberation in a ‘behavioural lock-in’, and deliberative
behaviour, which is used for larger, less frequent choices. Rational
actor type models are not appropriate for the ﬁrst behaviour type,
but have some merit in the second.31 Routine behaviour, and
potential changes to it, might apply to behaviour before and after
installation of microgeneration or other energy-saving methods.
In this context, Stern32 found that ‘many environmentally
signiﬁcant behaviours are matters of personal habit or household
routine and are rarely considered at all’. Deliberative behaviour is
more useful in questions of purchasing or installing
microgeneration units. For example, installing a PV system is an
important decision that may be taken only once in a person’s life;
its evaluation includes not only subsistence and comfort but also
identity, freedom, ‘belongingness’ and more.33
People generally see government as responsible for addressing
environmental problems and expect government (or industry) to
take the initiative; they see themselves as having little effect, or
prime responsibility for these problems. This disempowerment,
rather than ownership, includes energy production, usage,
efﬁciency and needs.31,34,35 There is a lack of connection between
personal behaviour and global consequences, as well as a lack of
understanding of the impacts of individual behaviour on energy
usage and carbon dioxide emissions/global warming. This
supports the idea that pro-environmental behavioural change can
be thought of as a transition in social norms, and therefore
behaviour change must occur at the collective, social level:
‘individual change is neither feasible nor sufﬁcient’.31 This implies
that change is required in the way the public view electricity
generation and distribution if microgeneration is not only to
spread but also to include the accompanying behaviour changes
needed to maximise its beneﬁts. Social networks are also
important – people’s choices can be strongly affected by friends,
family and celebrities/role models. Applying these ideas to
microgeneration implies two things.
(a) In order to maximise energy and carbon emission reductions,
institutional and cultural changes are needed beyond just
persuading individuals to install microgeneration units.
Public acceptance of renewables in many countries has misled
policymakers to believe that social acceptance – be it local
installations or willingness to invest in microgeneration –
would not be a problem.36 However, microgeneration requires
‘active’ acceptance on the part of the public as compared with
‘passive’ consent, which is sufﬁcient for large infrastructure
projects.35 This includes community acceptance for speciﬁc
sites and market acceptance for people to invest (unlike ‘green
energy’ which requires no actual involvement). Further,
market adoption can be separated from broader social
acceptance.36
(b) Without cultural and behavioural changes, maximising
installations might not in itself yield maximum potential
savings. As Keirstead puts it ‘there is a danger that if
behavioural responses to microgeneration technologies are
not considered now, when consumer technologies and
protocols are still being developed, then the industry could
ﬁnd that households become locked into behaviours that may
be undesirable in the longer term’.37 In other words, ‘it would
be naive to think of microgeneration simply as another
generation technology’.38
Policy has to come to terms with these contexts if it is to inﬂuence
individual behaviour; information on its own is unlikely to be
effective against powerful inﬂuences such as social norms and
prices, and mixed messages can lead to resentment.31,34 The
government must also contend with low levels of trust and
perceptions of lack of fairness in key actors; these factors have
been identiﬁed as inﬂuential in previous opposition to renewable
energy, affecting how information is received by the public.39
Stern advises using different combinations of policy measures to
change routine behaviour until the most effective combination is
found.32 The UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) – now
known as the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory
Reform (BERR) – microgeneration strategy10 looks at top-down
community installations, and in what appears to be politics of
aspiration declares that ‘An attractive community installation can
familiarise local residents with microgeneration technologies,
demonstrate the potential for home generation and maybe even
encourage people to change their own behaviour to be more
energy efﬁcient’.40
3.2. Systemic change
Research into the diffusion of innovation often describes the
uptake of new technologies as a process with adopters classiﬁed in
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categories of innovators, early adopters, early majority, late
majority and laggards (see Figure 141). Innovators and early
adopters put more weight on personal motivations, which could
include saving money, love of technology and self-sufﬁciency,
while the majority of later adopters put more weight on social
motivations, which could include social status of the technology
and friends and relatives who have purchased it.41 The former are
willing to pay more money and take bigger risks when buying a
new technology, while for the latter, purchase requires a lower
price (or shorter payback time) and a good reputation. Uptake by
innovators and early adopters therefore does not guarantee
success in diffusion to the greater public. The necessary leap of
microgeneration from early adopters to the majority, if it is to
become a major part of the UK energy system, must take these
lessons into account.
The need for institutional, behavioural and cultural change, as
well as the notion of lock-in are all present in transitions theory.
This stipulates that persistent problems (such as reduction in
household energy use or carbon dioxide emissions), which include
social, institutional and structural issues, cannot be solved by top-
down incremental changes alone, but instead require radical,
systemic change over years or decades. Transition theory warns
against focusing on system optimisation rather than system
innovation.42,43 Such a transition may be catalysed by new
functionalities or behaviour associated with a new technology.
These can affect uptake as demand for the new functionality itself
emerges, as opposed to the demand for the technology that
introduced it.43 For example, mobile phones precipitated changes
in behaviour, such as blurring boundaries between work and
social life, private and public life, and introduced new
functionalities, such as quick text, photo messaging on the move
and availability of communication, which themselves have
become sought after.44 New functionalities in the microgeneration
context could include on the one hand concepts of households as
‘energy co-providers’45 or ‘energy citizens’46 and, on the other,
easily available information on energy usage, production, export
and price through new metering options.
The new functionalities of microgeneration could potentially be a
disruptive innovation to the current conventional central
generation of electricity and home-generated heat via boilers.
Disruptive technology introduces a new value proposition that
might create a new market or reshape the existing market.47,48 A
shift to generation of electricity and possibly production of heat
via the range of available microgeneration technologies will alter
the shape of the electricity and gas markets, which in turn will
affect not only consumers but also larger market players such as
suppliers, generators and market operators. Although
microgeneration might not necessarily be very efﬁcient compared
with larger electricity-producing devices in power plants, taking
losses in the network into account makes microgeneration viable
as it increases overall efﬁciency and potentially reduces
customers’ energy bills. It thus becomes a desirable option for
residential customers who might displace a portion of
conventional generation.
The current lock-in is evident in that ‘technical infrastructure and
social norms interact to affect behaviour over time. Both may be
resistant to change’.34 However, the current focus is on
incremental change, not systemic shift. Watson et al. believe that
‘current policy is too focused on incremental changes. It misses
opportunities to support micro-generation as part of a broader
shift towards demand reduction and consumer behaviour
change’.38 For example, uncertainty surrounding grants leads
installers to focus on maximising sales. They might not be aware
of their ability to inﬂuence consumers’ behaviour, and this limited
interaction reduces energy-saving possibilities; reaping the full
beneﬁts requires a supportive socio-technical system to be in
place.37 Another way to express this missed opportunity is the
difference between an ‘energy consumer’ scenario and an ‘energy
citizen’ scenario49 (Table 2). At present (business-as-usual), people
are both consumers and citizens, but business and industry focus
on the former. In the microgeneration context, this focus
encourages hard sales to maximise uptake, but not environmental
beneﬁt, leading to the microgeneration/consumer scenario.
However, a shift to focusing on energy citizenship could
encourage wise use and greater energy savings, leading to the
microgeneration/citizen scenario.
3.3. Motivations and barriers
There are various motivations and barriers, some more rational
than others, in the decision to purchase microgeneration. The
‘rational’ motivations most often listed are economic,
environmental, technological interest and self-sufﬁciency,50,51
with other motivations including familiarity of technologies,
social acceptance and more.
3.3.1. Cost. The economics of microgeneration – up-front cost,
payback times and potential long-term savings – are an important
consideration in the decision if and what to buy. The up-front
price of microgeneration is still a real barrier to many and, without
subsidies, large parts of the population would be excluded.33,52,53
Payback times can be very long. For example, for a PV system,
some estimates are 30 years,33 although the current study
approximated a period closer to 60 years (see Table 1); this is
similar to the life expectancy of the unit, or even longer. Subsidies,
grants and innovative tariffs can shorten payback times for
consumers.
Early
adopters
Early
majority
Late
majority
Innovators
Laggards
Figure 1. The ﬁve categories of innovativeness41
Scenario Energy consumer Energy citizen
Business-as-usual Economic rights
(and social
opportunities)
. more is better
Political rights
. voting
. earning
. responsibilities
Microgeneration Buy more
microgeneration!
smart houses,
passive users
Wise use and
sufﬁciency! smart
houses, smart users
Table 2. Qualities of energy consumption and citizenship, present
and possible future scenarios (adapted from Janda49)
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The cost barrier is crucial, as ﬁnancial motivations commonly
underpin energy conservation. While environmental values and
concerns may increase people’s willingness to conserve energy,
they are considered alongside perceived costs and beneﬁts.54 It is
also worth noting that the perception of costs is sometimes
inaccurate. For example, in a study of attitudes towards rooftop
microgeneration, over 50% of Londoners surveyed thought it
would be too expensive to install. However, solar thermal prices
were overestimated and PV prices underestimated; cavity wall
insulation prices were also overestimated.55
A variety of ideas for help with costs are available, for example
(a) including installation costs with mortgages (especially for
new houses) since people make long-term calculations when
buying property33
(b) installing microgeneration in social housing
(c) providing clear guidance on ROCs and other schemes
(d ) reducing VAT and including microgeneration technologies in
the CERT (see also Section 2.2.2)
(e) rewarding electricity export.40
However, Sauter and Watson35 question the notion of consumers
as rational economic agents – speciﬁcally, the notion that
households will only invest in microgeneration if the payback
time is in the range of a few years. Most households in the UK do
not invest in energy-saving measures that are proven to have such
a payback time (e.g. cavity wall insulation), while more invest in
double glazing, which has a much longer payback time. This is
probably a result of both the images of the two technologies,
including familiarity with double glazing and its visibility, and
additional immediate beneﬁts of double glazing, most notably
noise reduction. People tend to discount or devalue delayed
outcomes; they generally do not consider future savings or
revenues from energy.33,53 The dilemma between short-term
negative outcome and long-term positive outcome can cause
cognitive dissonance; people tend to discard long-term beneﬁts
for reasons such as high cost, excessive bureaucracy, minute
contribution to the environment, and so on.33
3.3.2. Export tariffs. An important part of cost considerations
are export tariffs for producing and exporting electricity, which
can be an important incentive to both installation and efﬁcient
use. There are limited customer-facing drivers and even early
adopters are only willing to pay a modest premium for new
technology.29
Not all consumers are paid for their exports and (until recently)
tariffs were not high enough to inﬂuence consumer
behaviour.29,37 Ofgem has made it compulsory for suppliers to
quote a buyback price for customers selling electricity to the grid.
The value of microgeneration to the supplier varies according to
the type of generation (predictable or intermittent) and, more
importantly, how much is actually exported into the grid.56 The
export reward can consist of a ﬁxed lump-sum payment (usually
for unmetered generation) or variable payments (usually for
metered generation). Currently, retailers offer tariffs of
4.25–18 p/kWh for metered generation, depending on a variety of
factors including supplier, region, type of generator and type of
residence.56 Unmetered reward for export is currently valued at
around £10 per year on the EDF green tariff scheme and £18 per
year on British Gas ecosave; energy supplier e.on estimates a lump
sum payment based on characteristics of customers’ consumption
patterns.56 Higher export rewards offer an improvement for
consumers and incentives for manufacturers to improve electrical
efﬁciency. However, incentives must avoid supporting excess heat
generation and dumping for electricity rewards. In any case,
tariffs are expected to be lower than retail price.29 The government
is pushing to reward renewable microgeneration with two ROCs
per MWh (9 p/kWh) and this is aimed to start in April 2009.56
For Stirling engines (and assumed prices), the Carbon Trust found
no commercial beneﬁt for domestic users without payment for
electricity export.
More recently, several companies in the UK have started offering
tariffs with better incentives for consumers. For example, Good
Energy requires installation of a generated electricity meter and
pays a ﬂat tariff for generated electricity with no reward for
export.57 Equipower installs free export meters for its customers
and pays different tariffs for generation and export of PV and
wind turbine energy.58 Both companies offer customers incentives
for microgeneration. The Good Energy scheme and the Equipower
wind tariff create an incentive to maximise energy use on-site as
this maximises the reward: the tariff is received and bills for grid
electricity are reduced. Equipower PV gives a larger incentive for
export (Table 3). Ofgem recommends regulating feed-in tariffs for
microgeneration export to the grid.59 This would force grid
operators to allow access to exported energy. Export price would
be ﬁxed, although it might vary between technologies. Feed-in
tariffs are already used in some European Union countries to
encourage renewable energy development and have proved
successful in Germany, Spain and Denmark. In Germany, the
‘100 000 rooftop programme’ resulted in signiﬁcant growth in PV
instalments from 1999, but it was the introduction of ﬁxed-rate
tariffs per kWh generated that enabled a real market take-off, as
well as creating thousands of jobs.60 Tariffs must be high enough
to encourage the market, but if they are too high they could
ultimately stiﬂe investment.61
Under the microgeneration strategy10 launched in 2006, suppliers
were encouraged to offer export rewards to domestic customers
Supplier Tariff for generated
electricity:
p/kWh
Additional tariff for
exported electricity:
p/kWh
Savings for on-site use
of generated electricity:
p/kWh
Savings from
exported electricity:
p/kWh
Good Energy57 9 0 21 9
EBICo Equipower PV58 0 18 12 18
EBICo Equipower wind58 5 5 17 10
Table 3. 2008 tariffs for generation and export of energy from two different companies and the resulting savings, assuming 12 p/kWh price
for grid-generated electricity
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with microgenerators. In general, these tariffs might encourage an
increased uptake of microgeneration as well as appropriate
application of microgeneration. For example, if suppliers
incentivise export of electricity produced by solar, customers
might install more PV panels. However, this type of technology-
based rewards system should be analysed carefully – customers
need to know whether the payback time for their investment is
economical.
Ofgem has recently introduced a requirement for suppliers to be
more transparent in reporting their portfolios for green tariffs.56
Hopefully this will allow renewable microgeneration to be
included in the same portfolio, giving suppliers a higher
percentage of green energy production and at the same time
rewarding owners of microgenerators. Increasing electricity and
gas prices as well as the existence of proper incentives for
microgeneration could make the adoption of renewable
microgeneration rewarding. For micro-CHP the situation is more
complicated: economic viability depends largely on the existence
of a considerable gap between electricity and gas prices and the
export reward might therefore be unsustainable over time.
Moreover, the emissions savings of natural-gas-powered CHP
depend on the carbon dioxide intensity of the grid.
3.3.3. Environmental awareness. A 2006 in-depth study on
renewable energy of over 6000 UK consumers51 found strong
support for renewable energy: 68% stated they would like their
electricity to be derived from renewables, 44% from large-scale
and 24% from microgeneration. The most common motive for
supporting renewables was reported to be preventing climate
change (44%), with saving energy costs (24%) and self-sufﬁciency
(22%) also important. Although this shows that there is
environmental awareness, there is still little conscious awareness
among most consumers that ‘lights, heating and appliances within
the home are running off fossil fuels extracted from the earth and
sea, let alone that a by-product of their usage is carbon emissions
which are the key drivers behind climate change’.62 Furthermore,
as mentioned earlier, environmental motivations are commonly
underpinned by ﬁnancial motivations54 and thus may not be
enough to catalyse action on their own. Therefore, while
continuing to raise environmental awareness, speciﬁcally about
the connection of household behaviour with climate change, is
necessary for domestic emission reductions, it is not sufﬁcient.
3.3.4. Technology as motivation and barrier. An interest in
technology is important among innovators and early adopters.
For example, Haas et al.50 found that participants in PV trials in
Austria were typical innovators, ‘technically interested and ready
for ﬁnancial risk’. A German study63 found that those interested in
participating in trials of domestic fuel cell CHP had more interest
in new technology, higher technical education (compared with the
general public) and a belief that technologies could solve
environmental problems. In the UK, installation of
microgeneration is most likely to be environmentally motivated,
although some are motivated through love of technology.62
Jager33 found that among trial PV installers in the Netherlands,
technical support offered by the municipality was the lowest of
seven motivations for installation and, in sharp contrast to the UK,
most people in the sample installed the PVs themselves. This ﬁts
the proﬁle of innovators, but also has to do with regulation
differences between the two countries.
Most of the population has a less innovative attitude than
innovators and early adopters and the prevalent perception that
some technologies are immature or unreliable can be a major
barrier to purchase.34,35 Making matters worse, there is a
problem of lack of technical expertise. For example, there is a
lack of installation and maintenance skills for domestic CHPs,
which could result in inappropriate installation or inefﬁcient
use, and failures in commercial CHPs or domestic PV systems
can go unnoticed for a long time without expertise for assessing
performance.29,64 However, the fact that there are similar
problems with conventional heating systems33 supports the idea
that there is a need for a cultural shift if the demanding energy
and emission reductions of 80% are to be achieved in general,
and if this young technology is to succeed in particular.
3.3.5. Familiarity and habit. Familiarity and habit also play a
part in decision making. The Energy Saving Trust65 models
familiarity as a simple function of overall installed units in the
UK. This is consistent with studies such as that undertaken by
London Renewables,66 which found that while a vast majority
were in favour of renewable energy, solar and wind were more
likely to be supported than CHP, incineration or anaerobic
digestion; the negative view of the latter technologies could be
related to lack of knowledge about them. However, some studies
show the importance of personal history and experience or the
‘exposure effect’. For example, Allegra Strategies51 interviews
indicated people who ‘only know’ gas, oil or coal, and don’t
wish to try anything new; most of these respondents were aged
55 or over. Other aspects of familiarity include the ‘observability
effect’, notably of PV systems, which could aid diffusion, and
the lack of ‘trialability’ of PV (and other microgeneration)
systems, meaning the system cannot be tried before
installation.33
3.3.6. Social motivations. Beyond familiarity, networks of
friends and acquaintances could play an important role in the
signiﬁcant and complex decision of microgeneration. Jager33
found that social motivations for installing a PV system were
strong among the socially informed, who tended to know more
people with PV. He suggests that for the general population, social
effects could be more important than for early adopters, with a
potential role for role models and viral marketing. This is in line
with diffusion of innovation.41
Social motivations also include the social status connected with
environmentally aware behaviour. Green consumerism relies on
the fact that consumption is partially motivated by the social
status purchased products might confer, and attempts to attach
higher status to environmentally-friendly products. However, it
is not clear that this will contribute to reducing environmental
problems.67 If the social motivation is dominant, there is a push
for visible action over environmentally effective action. A prime
example, if anecdotal, comes from a BBC radio interview in
2007 (transcript cited in Crompton67) ‘ . . . One of my friends has
got a solar panel on the north-facing roof of her house. When I
pointed out to her that’s not necessarily the best place in the UK
in order to be generating energy, she pointed out to me that I
wasn’t understanding why she’d done it. The north-facing part
of her house is the part that faces the street’. Social (and other
non-environmental) motivations for installing microgeneration
also risk increased energy use through the rebound effect (see
Section 3.5).
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3.4. Information and choice of technology
3.4.1. Information and promotion. The BERR (formerly the DTI)
recommends: overcoming information constraints by producing
information for the construction industry and (separately) for
local authorities; developing a comprehensive accreditation
scheme; and information campaigns for consumers to ﬁll
information gaps and raise the proﬁle of microgeneration.40,68
However, this does not address the limitations to information
supply alone, and Devine-Wright39 warns against assuming
people have a clear idea about the carbon emissions of different
technologies; for example, some people believe natural gas is
‘renewable’ compared with low awareness of ‘biomass’. Nor does it
address the issue of low levels of trust in public actors39 and ‘it is
crucial that microgeneration does not earn a bad image because of
mis-selling and bullying sales tactics’.69
Jager33 reports on a PV diffusion exercise in the Netherlands
following high subsidies in 2001–2003, and speciﬁcally on
promotional campaigns in the city of Groningen. Although the
media considered the scheme a success, from a strictly economic
perspective the uptake was modest considering the 90% subsidy,
which reduced break-even time to three years. In Groningen, the
municipality promoted the scheme through newspaper
advertisements and special information meetings on PV systems
to address technical and bureaucratic barriers, but the grants were
the same as nationally. Some 113 out of 188 (60%) interviewees
attended at least one meeting. The meetings slightly reduced the
perceived bureaucratic and technical installation barriers,
although neither was seen as a very difﬁcult barrier beforehand.
Nonetheless, the uptake in Groningen was about ten times the
Dutch average. While this undoubtedly points to a successful
campaign, even in Groningen those who took up the offer had a
higher awareness of environmental problems than the general
population, which would imply that they were still early adopters.
In the UK, television is one of the main sources of information
about renewable energy, with newspapers playing an important
part in rural areas. As customers deal with suppliers directly,
suppliers can be a source of information on renewable energy and
available microgeneration options. Direct experience, such as
visiting wind farms, is also important.39
3.4.2. What determines choice of technology? Microgeneration
refers to a basket of technologies, some of which use renewable
sources and some of which offer energy efﬁciency even if they
use fossil fuels. Behaviour and attitudes may therefore be
technology speciﬁc and choosing what to install has to do with
the aforementioned motivations of cost and environmental
effect. BERR proposes to develop a ‘route map’ for each
technology,40 which could help determine targets and criteria
for the most appropriate technology in different households.
However, information may be lacking: people do not always
know the costs, carbon emissions and other parameters of
different technologies,39 making reputation and familiarity
important.
This can lead to the emergence of a dominant design in each
microgeneration category or even one microgeneration type.
A technology that is ﬁrst to be marketed or is the one being
chosen by a majority of consumers could go on to be the
dominant technology due to familiarity and ease of access. This
in turn yields more resources to develop it further, hence
accelerating its development. As Suarez and Utterback70
claimed, ‘a dominant design has the effect of enforcing
standardization so that production economies can be sought’.
However, the problem with this emergence is that the chosen
technology might not necessarily be the best in terms of
technical performance and cost. For example, if the
WhisperGen71 Stirling engine micro-CHP unit is ready to be
marketed ﬁrst, the company would continue to develop a supply
chain and build a customer base. The reduced market size and
locked-in Whispergen customers then make it difﬁcult for
another producer to penetrate the market in the future. Home
information packs (HIPs), which list energy-saving measures in
order of the potential carbon dioxide emissions saved, are
beginning to address this.
People relate to speciﬁc technologies more than the broad term
‘renewables’; wind, solar and hydro-power are the most
recognised, compared with biomass which is less well known.
Wind and solar have ‘iconic’ value as renewable sources; while
solar is the most positively regarded, wind farms are the most
socially contentious.39 In one survey, most Londoners questioned
were found to be aware of solar and wind power, and felt they
knew at least something about them (with solar thermal and PV
better known than micro-wind),55,66 but information gaps exist
around practical information such as cost, how the technologies
are installed and who installs them. In contrast, other technologies
(including CHP) are less well known, poorly understood and were
not intuitively considered ‘renewable’ in the same way as the
former. Ellison55 found that approximately 21% of a sample were
‘very likely’ or ‘fairly likely’ to install PV or solar thermal,
compared with 6% for micro-wind.
The Welsh Consumer Council69 reports that solar-thermal
technologies sometimes have a sales reputation problem, with
some companies implicated in aggressive sales tactics and inﬂated
prices. The council warns ‘the greater the risk of people being mis-
sold unsuitable systems, the greater the risk to microgeneration’s
public reputation’.69 Other, newer technologies tend to be better
regulated and are less likely to fall into disrepute. However, sales
tactics such as unrealistically low payback times advertised by
manufacturers for some microgeneration installations72 could
also potentially harm microgeneration’s reputation. This
highlights the importance of consumers’ access to independent
advisors. Caird et al.73 found that most people ‘accepted the
recommendation of [solar thermal] installers, usually without
understanding the technology’. Installers’ opinions may be
crucial. Many people who considered microgeneration but
rejected it did so because of uncertainty about new technology.
Some 43% of people stated that reputation for unreliability was a
barrier to purchasing a condensing boiler – a reputation that
persisted until installation of such boilers became virtually
mandatory under UK building regulations in 2005.73
3.4.3. Who currently purchases microgeneration? Those
installing microgeneration in the UK match Rogers’ description of
innovators and early adopters41 and their socio-economic proﬁle
is different from that of the general population. Studies of PV
adopters in the UK37 and the Netherlands33 found they were older
than the average population, better educated, had a higher
environmental awareness, were wealthier and more likely to own
their own home. Reviewing different studies, Devine-Wright39
found
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(a) that older people were more aware of microgeneration, but
younger people were more likely to install it
(b) contradictory results as to the gender effect
(c) that people with higher income and in higher social classes
had more support for renewables in general, but limited
evidence that more informed individuals are more accepting
of low-carbon technologies
(d ) a clear correlation between political beliefs and acceptance of
microgeneration (with Conservatives less accepting than
Liberal Democrat or Labour supporters in the UK).
People investing in microgeneration had often implemented other
energy-saving measures, such as cavity wall insulation, efﬁcient
lighting and solar thermal installation, before installing PV.37,50
In other words, PV installation was the last part (so far) in an
energy conservation chain that might continue with other
measures after installation.
3.5. Behaviour change after purchase/installation
Results are ambiguous as to whether installing microgeneration
technologies (or moving into a house already ﬁtted with
microgeneration) will in itself cause behaviour change.35
However, Dobbyn and Thomas62 show evidence of awareness,
behaviour and attitudinal shifts for most people interviewed
after gaining microgeneration. This was true for both active (i.e.
choosing to install) and passive (living in a house with
microgeneration) households, with even modest amounts of
energy production having signiﬁcant behaviour impacts. Living
with microgeneration technology encouraged a greater
understanding of energy issues, often impacting on behaviour.
Households motivated through a love of technology or self-
sufﬁciency exhibited a greater shift in behaviour than
environmentally motivated households, which already had a
‘green’ lifestyle. However, the mere presence of technology did
not always cause this shift, with many passive households
exhibiting a ‘love of the newfound warmth and comfort of their
home’,62 without necessarily reducing energy consumption.
Changes to routine behaviour were observed, such as avoiding
turning lights and ﬁres on, switching appliances off at the
mains and using washing machines at peak production periods.
This is in contrast to mainstream routine behaviour, which
shows few attempts to reduce consumption and little conscious
awareness of the fact that the fossil fuels are burned for
lighting, heating and powering appliances. A better
understanding of this type of behaviour change, speciﬁcally
under what conditions it occurs, is vital to maximising the
energy-saving potential of microgeneration.
The PV installation experiment in Austria revealed that
households with high initial electricity consumption tended to
reduce their electricity usage, while those with a low initial
consumption tended to increase their usage.50 PV may thus be an
‘energy conservation tool for the rich’.50 Keirstead37 found two
signiﬁcant differences after PV installation: an increase in use of
green electricity tariffs and the use of efﬁcient lighting. People
reported that they were more likely to undertake efﬁciency
improvements to lighting and appliances, and were slightly more
likely to install other microgeneration. Keirstead also reports a
self-assessed overall saving of 5.6% in energy consumption,
largely the result of higher awareness of electricity generation and
consumption issues. However, it is difﬁcult to determine whether
these were temporary or long-lasting changes.
The increased use of energy after installing microgeneration is an
example of the rebound effect.74 The cheaper energy provided
may encourage consumers to use more energy, for example by
keeping the home warmer (direct rebound), or the money saved
from lower energy bills may be used on energy-intensive goods
and services (indirect rebound). Both cases reduce overall energy
and emission savings.
3.6. The importance of meters and feedback
Clear feedback is a necessary part of energy demand reduction,
including both instantaneous clear direct feedback, which could
be from smart meters or other monitors, and frequent accurate
billing (indirect feedback).75 Savings can reach 5–15% from direct
feedback and 0–10% from indirect feedback, and there are
synergies between the two. Furthermore, persistent feedback is
needed because energy savings can drop when monitors are
removed. Frequent accurate billing, rather than estimates, is
shown to be effective indirect feedback and, in the UK, historic
feedback proves more popular than comparative feedback.75
Without better billing, customers may not notice bill reduction.29
Relevant up-to-date information combined with better export
tariffs (which are starting to appear as discussed earlier) could help
realise potential energy savings.
Smart meters are a feedback mechanism that could kick-start an
upgrading of the UK’s metering system.38 Watson et al.38 see
smart meters as an essential part of a ‘reoriented energy
market’, rather than as an auxiliary purchase with
microgeneration units. The Green Alliance52 recommends
mandatory rolling out of smart metering, reporting that this
could deliver 7% or so of the needed carbon savings from the
domestic sector by 2010. However, ownership arrangements
need to be sorted out ﬁrst, and the Green Alliance calls for
promoting the meters as an energy-saving device under EECs.
The DTI looked into ‘ﬁeld trials that bring together smart meters
and microgeneration to the effectiveness of smart meters
combined with microgeneration technologies’.40 Meanwhile,
households installing microgeneration want monitors that show
both consumption and production.37 Barriers to smart meters
come from industry, which sees regulatory obstacles to their
expense, such as the 28-day rule for changing suppliers. This is
exacerbated by the small size of ﬁrms: it is expensive to add
consumption information to monitoring devices until the
industry grows.37 The 28-day rule was scrapped in August 2007.
It remains to be seen if this gives a push to the growth of smart
meters.
3.7. Discussion
There is great potential for microgeneration to play a part in
reducing emissions generated by the residential sector. However,
strategies designed at maximising uptake will not sufﬁce to
maximise energy and emission savings, even with information
campaigns. This will only happen with a cultural–behavioural
shift in consumers, industry and government.
The current situation can be described as a ‘lock-in’ in which
household energy usage is high and is growing faster than
efﬁciency gains are being made. Furthermore, any energy savings
made are lessened by the rebound effect. People feel
disempowered about their ability to effect change, expect
government to deliver environmental beneﬁts and do not make
the connection between personal behaviour and global climate
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change. Industry focuses on maximising sales through a
marketing approach, and lacks technical expertise for advice and
execution of most efﬁcient installations. A social status has been
created in relation to environmental behaviours, including
microgeneration, which cannot bring about the necessary change.
From a diffusion of innovation perspective, even successful
demonstration projects (such as the PV uptake in Groningen) only
affected innovators and early adopters. However, for
microgeneration to have a signiﬁcant impact on the energy
system, the mainstream public must be involved. Uptake among
the majority would require different strategies and policies, for
example social motivations may prevail over technical or
environmental factors.
From a transitions theory perspective, we can conclude that
system optimisation is not enough. A paradigm shift – a cultural,
infrastructural and economic transition – is necessary for
microgeneration to maximise environmental beneﬁts and play a
part in a broader shift of energy use to more sustainable patterns.
Such a shift must be at the cultural and social level, not the
individual level.
From a government perspective, various barriers to
microgeneration uptake need to be overcome. This will necessitate
gaining the public’s trust in government policies, sending out
clear information and avoiding mixed messages. Such a strategy
could include the following.
(a) Ensuring reliable subsidies and clear worthwhile export tariffs
are available for consumers. These would help overcome cost
barriers, both real and perceived. However, it is also necessary
to encourage people to consider long-term savings or revenue
from energy.
(b) Engaging with people at local and national levels to increase
public understanding of technologies, (re)build trust and
increase exposure and familiarity with microgeneration. This
could help overcome perceived technical barriers and raise the
proﬁle of various microgeneration technologies and their
environmental and other beneﬁts.
(c) Ensuring consumers have access to information from
independent advisors, as opposed to installers and
manufacturers.
(d ) Addressing disempowerment among consumers and
connecting behaviour at a household level to consequences so
people feel they can make a difference and take responsibility
for their actions.
(e) Utilising smart meters and other monitoring and good
feedback measures to increase information and
understanding about energy usage and production.
( f ) Engaging industry to deliver improved technical expertise for
microgeneration, to ensure installations are appropriate for
the sites, to make sure that maintenance is professional and
that consumers are given good information to make informed
choices. Further changes could include more energy service
companies (ESCOs) and a change in industry/consumer
relations.
A paradigm shift in the energy culture would lead to new
production and consumption models. This could include various
ideas, for example empowering consumers to be ‘energy citizens’
or ‘energy co-providers’ who play an active role in the energy
system, or ‘virtual power plants’ where microgeneration in
individual homes is activated from afar. Further research is needed
to check public acceptance of such ideas. New functionalities
could emerge in this process, around home production of energy
and its sale to a local or national grid or sophisticated energy
monitoring and use, although their exact nature would be difﬁcult
to determine. Ultimately, a successful paradigm shift would ensure
high uptake of microgeneration, increased understanding and
awareness of energy production and consumption, and emissions
reductions.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has reviewed the policy and behavioural aspects of
microgeneration, with a particular focus on the UK. Existing
policy supports a wide range of carbon prices; however,
improvements in clarity are required, particularly with regard to
building regulations and the SAP. The CERT is the best directed
policy instrument regarding carbon savings, but could be
reformulated to ensure absolute carbon reductions are achieved as
opposed to reduction over business-as-usual. Regional/local
approaches could be effective in promoting uptake, but clarity is
required with regard to deﬁning responsibilities.
The behavioural issues pertinent to microgeneration are a potent
factor in dictating uptake and use. Most existing microgeneration
policy focuses on uptake, and behaviour after uptake is largely
ignored. In order to formulate a complete policy framework for
accelerating the penetration of microgeneration into the energy
generation mix, it is clear that research is required into the policy–
behaviour interface for successful uptake and application.
Successful uptake of the most appropriate installations with good
information provision could maximise emissions savings and
increase citizens’ awareness of their energy usage and potential
savings.
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